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CLD-200         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1831 
 ___________ 
 
 T.B., 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of Delaware 
 (D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-00168) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson; previously, Honorable Gregory M. Sleet 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 26, 2011 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
  
 
 (Opinion filed: June 9, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 T.B., representing himself and proceeding in forma pauperis, filed suit against the 
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Attorney General of the State of Delaware.
1
  He claimed that he was being intimidated 
for filing complaints.  In support of his claim, he described an appointment he had at the 
doctor for an infection (an infection that he attributes somehow to government actors), 
and teasing or harassment he suffered from fellow residents at a homeless shelter after his 
appointment.  He also alleged that the defendant provided misleading information about 
his criminal history (including charges from 2004 in Philadelphia) to the Transportation 
Security Administration (“TSA”), which led to an initial assessment by TSA that he may 
not be eligible for a transportation worker identification credential.  (He included the 
document issued by TSA.)  T.B. also made the bold claim that legal documents were 
stolen from him by “officials and their agents” to blackmail others.  He also sought to 
hold the defendant liable for that fact that another man at the homeless shelter spit at him.  
He blames the defendant for his having to sleep in a public park.     
 Among the motions he submitted with his complaint, T.B. filed a motion to stay 
an order of the Delaware Supreme Court denying T.B.‟s motion for an emergency 
hearing after concluding that there was no support for T.B.‟s claim that government 
officials were conspiring to harm him.  He also requested that the District Court take him 
into protective custody because open charges are pending against him and because law 
enforcement officials have not acted on them.  He additionally moved to “stay” the TSA 
initial assessment.    
 The District Court dismissed T.B.‟s complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
                                                 
1
For convenience, we will identify the parties as they are currently identified in the 
caption.    
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1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and concluded that amendment was futile.  The District Court also 
denied T.B.‟s then-pending motions as moot.  T.B. appeals.  He also presents a motion 
for an “emergency hearing on civil and criminal contempt of court,” and two 
amendments to that motion.  The Attorney General of the State of Delaware opposes 
T.B.‟s motion, arguing that it should be dismissed or denied as legally frivolous.  In 
response, T.B. argues that he is not even seeking all of the relief that the Attorney 
General of the State of Delaware contends that he is seeking and asks us to dismiss the 
Attorney General‟s motion.     
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. ' 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the dismissal of T.B.‟s complaint.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Turner v. Crawford Square Apts. III, L.P., 449 F.3d 
542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006).  We review the denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion.  
See Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2004).  Upon review, we will 
dismiss this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) because it does not have an 
arguable basis in fact or law.  See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).   
 The District Court properly dismissed T.B.‟s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than “„labels or 
conclusions.‟”  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).  It “must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to „state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟”  Id.  The 
“„plausibility‟ determination will be „a context-specific task that requires the reviewing 
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.‟”  Fowler v. UPMC 
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Shadyside , 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal). 
 T.B. did not meet the plausibility test.  As the District Court put it, T.B. largely did 
not plead the personal involvement of the defendant.  Even where he did allege personal 
involvement (such as feeding information to TSA), he relied on a TSA-issued document 
that undermined his claim (in that it described an ordinary review of his criminal history).  
Also, and more fundamentally, from T.B.‟s allegations, it is unclear how the Attorney 
General of Delaware plausibly is or could be tied to the misfortune that T.B. has suffered.    
 Furthermore, to the extent that T.B. sought review of a decision of the Delaware 
Supreme Court, his action was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); Great Western 
Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (setting 
forth a four-part test for when to apply the doctrine derived from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust 
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 
U.S. 462 (1983)).   
 For these reasons, the District Court did not err in dismissing T.B.‟s complaint, 
denying his motions, and disallowing amendment as futile.  We also deny T.B.‟s pending 
motion (and its amendments), in which he largely registers complaints about how he was 
treated by deputy United States Marshals (they apparently charged him with disorderly 
conduct and creating a nuisance).  (He also notes an arrest on the steps of the United 
States Supreme Court; other claimed stalking and threats by government agents; and, 
although it is not entirely clear, a purportedly open warrant for his arrest on which no one 
is acting.)  The allegations, over which we do not have original jurisdiction, are unrelated 
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to his appeal. 
 In short, we will dismiss this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  We 
also grant the  Attorney General of the State of Delaware‟s motion2 and deny T.B.‟s 
motion (with its amendments).  We also direct the Clerk to unseal this appeal and the 
Clerk of the United States District Court for the District Court of Delaware to unseal 
T.B.‟s District Court case.  T.B. did not show good cause in the District Court for the 
imposition of a blanket impoundment of his case, and he has not shown good cause for 
the continued impoundment of his documents on appeal, despite our explicit invitation 
for him to explain why we should continue the seal imposed by the District Court.  See 
Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 790 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Miller v. 
Indiana Hosp., 16 F.3d 549, 552 (3d Cir. 1994) (describing the heavy burden a litigant 
must meet to seal an entire record and advising district courts to make specific finding on 
the record before taking the unusual step of sealing an entire record in ordinary civil 
litigation).    
                                                 
2
We nonetheless agree with T.B. that his petition was not, as the Attorney General 
of the State of Delaware stated that it was in part, a petition for a writ of 
mandamus.  However, we will not grant T.B.‟s request to dismiss the Attorney 
General‟s motion on this or any other basis.     
